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We examine strategic procurement behaviour by governments and its e¤ect on
market structure in sectors, such as defence and pharmaceuticals, where the govern-
ment is the dominant consumer. In a world economy with trade between producer
countries, and between producers and non-producers, we use a modied Dixit-Stiglitz
utility function with an independent taste for variety. There is free entry and exit by
rms, but by anticipating their participation constraint governments can indirectly
choose the number of domestic rms and their size through its choice of procurement
price. Unlike the standard model with no independent taste for variety and no external
sector of non-producer countries, there are incentives for subsidies, openness impacts
on industrial structure and procurement coordination between producer countries af-
fects rm numbers.
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Government procurement constitutes an important share of a typical countrys GDP (up
to 20% in some cases). In some industries, domestic government procurement is also the
most important source of sales and this is clearly the case in the defence and pharmaceu-
tical industries (see e.g., Achilladelis and Antonakis, 2001 and Kyle, 2007). As the World
Trade Organization expands the restrictions over traditional protectionist trade policies,
procurement practices could be used as a less obvious trade policy tool to promote strategic
domestic industries. We refer to this as strategic procurement. The governments prefer-
ence for maintaining a domestic provider base within sensitive industriescan provide a
justication for strategic procurement.1
The defence industry provides a clear example of domestic rms survival directly de-
pending on government purchasing commitments and regulatory environment (see Dunne
et al., 2003). An interesting illustration of this fact is the 1993 merger wave of US mili-
tary rms.2 In the pharmaceutical industry, according to Kyle (2007), in many producer
countries the price for prescribed drugs to be paid by domestic health authorities is set
high enough to support the local pharmaceutical industry, which is a big employer and
important export earner.3 Interestingly, in both industries, there has been a recent ten-
dency towards an increase in concentration. In the defence industry, for the top 100 rms,
Dunne et al. (2003) report falls in the inverse Herndahl index from 49 to 22, between
1990 and 1998. For the pharmaceutical industry, Matraves (1999) reports an increase in
global market shares of the top 10 pharmaceutical companies from 25% to 31% between
1988 and 1995, also rms in ranked places from 11th to 20th saw increases in their market
shares. Changes to procurement policies may be behind these trends.4
1The Government Procurement Agreement precludes countries from using domestic supplier preferential
treatment to promote local industrial sectors. But, exceptions to the Agreement include procurement
indispensable for national security or for national defence purposes.
2This was stimulated by the last supperwhen the Pentagon Deputy Secretary Perry told a dinner of
defence industry executives that they were expected to start merging. It ended when the Pentagon decided
it had gone far enough and blocked the merger of Lockheed Martin with Northrop Grumman in early 1997
(Markusen and Costigan, 1999). Dunne et al. (2003) provide a detailed description of these changes.
3For the case of the UK, the Pharmaceutical Industry Competitiveness Task Force (PICTF), created
in 2000 is openly aimed at ensuring that the UK remains the base for the development of new drugs.
4 In a recent report, the O¢ ce of Fair Trade in the UK (OFT, 2004) argues that, in sectors such as
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The above mentioned industries share a number of additional characteristics which
may inuence procurement decisions. First, procurement authorities usually have a pref-
erence bias for the consumption of domestic goods (home bias), which could arise from
concerns about security of supply in conict or a desire to maintain a domestic indus-
trial base in these sectors. Such concerns are subject to change across industry and time
(see Achilladelis and Antonakis, 2001, PICTF, 2005 and NHS procurement review, 1998).
Second, procurement authorities are interested in purchasing a variety of products that
gives an aggregate provision of either military capability or medicines provision. Variety is
important to the procurement authority so as to cover a spectrum of health and security
risks. Third, there is a relatively well-established set of producer countries. Most countries
cannot a¤ord the massive R&D required to set up a major weapon systems or innovative
drugs industry and, therefore, there is a small number of producer countries serving both
themselves and the non-producer countries. This means that there is scope for producer
countries to interact strategically.
Our main objective is to examine the impact of strategic procurement behaviour on
the market structure of producer countries. More specically, we analyze the impact that
changes in home bias, taste for variety or the relative size of the non-producer market may
have on procurement prices and market structure. We also study whether governments get
a better dealfrom their domestic producers, that is, whether the price paid for domestic
procurement is lower or higher than the price at which domestic producers sell interna-
tionally. In addition, we investigate the potential impact of international coordination of
procurement decisions on concentration. Such analysis is relevant to the industries we have
in mind in this paper. As discussed by Hartley (2006), there is an ongoing debate within
EU countries about the possible gains from coordinating defence procurement decisions.
Di¤erent possible levels of coordination are being suggested; the lowest level would just
imply a coordinated decision on domestic procurement. It is the consequence of this type
of cooperation that we aim to model in our paper. There has also been an increase in the
coordination in the regulation of the pharmaceutical industry in the EU which is relevant
to the present paper (see Vogel, 1998).
We construct a model of strategic public procurement and international trade. There
human health services and manufacture of weapons and munitions, public procurement is likely to be
having an impact on market structure.
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are both producer and non-producer countries. Governments in producer countries buy
products from the domestic rms and also import from the rest of the world, governments
in non-producer countries cover their public procurement needs through imports. Govern-
ments endogenously determine the number of domestic rms by committing to a domestic
procurement price that ensures their existence.
Our focus in this paper is the decision of the military or public health authority on how
best to utilize the budgets they have, which are assumed to be exogenous. Endogeneiz-
ing the expenditure choice would be interesting, but far from straightforward. Military
capability is just a component one factor in a measure of national security. The choice
of how much to spend on military capability is a¤ected by a number of factors such as
the impact that this expenditure may have on the behavior of potential adversaries (see
García-Alonso and Levine (2007) for a discussion). Even for the health sector, we are
really only considering medicines provision; a complete measure of health provision would
include many other factors such as numbers of GPs, preventive health, etc. which we do
not analyze in this paper.
An important feature of our model is the existence of producer and non-producer
countries. A big domestic market and strong home bias (see Levine et al., 2000) may
a¤ect governments decision to initially support a domestic industry. Other factors, such
as export controls, limit the access that importer countries have to sensitive military tech-
nologies. Also, regulations on prices and patents are important determinants of why some
countries may become drug producers (see Achilladelis and Antonakis, 2001). However,
our model does not aim to explain the reasons for countries to become producers; that is,
we take the producer or non-producer status as given.
The interaction between the procurement authorities across countries and rms is
modelled as a four-stage game with a subgame perfect equilibrium (henceforth, SPE).
First, given the procurement budget, producer governments choose the volume and price
of domestically procured goods. Second, given procurement decisions rms enter or leave
the sector. Third, rms in producer countries simultaneously compete in export prices
and nally, governments in both producer and non-producer countries procure imports.
We then use backwards induction to nd the SPE.
In a standard Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition model of trade only involving
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producers (see Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977), the procurement price turns out to be the world
market price, the bias for domestic rather than imported procured goods, the inverse of
opennessin our terminology, has no e¤ect on market structure and the non-cooperative
procurement equilibrium is e¢ cient (from the viewpoint of producers). As a result of two
features of our model, these results no longer hold: rst, the existence of an external market
of non-producers importing goods from producers and second, we use a modied Dixit-
Stiglitz utility function as in Benassy (1996) to incorporate a taste for variety e¤ect that
is independent of the elasticity of substitution. The latter allows the choice as to whether
to procure an additional variety to be di¤erent from the choice of quantity procured.
In this paper, we nd that the price that procurement authorities pay to their domestic
rms may be higher or lower than the imports price. Procurement authorities are more
likely to overpaytheir domestic rms if they have a high taste for variety and the external
market is relatively small.
In addition, we show that an increase in openness, a reduction in taste for variety
and an increase in the relative size of the external market reduce the number of rms
in equilibrium. This result provides a theoretical explanation for the recent increases in
concentration in both the defence and the pharmaceutical industry. Increased development
costs and a reduction in health and military budgets may be among the other factors
determining such trends (see Achilladelis and Antonakis, 2001).
Our paper also shows that cooperation between the governments of producer countries
in setting procurement policies a¤ects rm numbers. Such impact will depend on the size
of the external market and the additional taste for variety e¤ect. For instance, with a
non-producer fringe but, no additional taste for variety factor, cooperation would lead to
an increase in concentration. For the case of no external market but, additional taste for
variety factor, the opposite holds.
Our research is linked to a branch of the procurement and trade literature starting
with Baldwin (1970).5 This literature studies the impact of unilaterally home-biased
5A second branch of the procurement literature focuses on the interaction between rms and procurer
in a environment characterized by the existence of asymmetric information (examples of that literature
are McAfee and McMillan, 1989, Anton and Yao, 1992, La¤ont and Tirole, 1993, Branco, 1994, McGuire
and Riordan, 1995 and, Vagstad, 1995). Our paper abstracts from such issues. A third strand analyzes
the interaction between domestic defence procurement and rm competition for international arms trade
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procurement on the patterns of international specialization. Baldwin (1970, 1984) shows
that a unilateral home bias in favour of domestic producers is inconsequential to the
patterns of specialization under the assumption of perfect competition. Later papers
prove that this neutrality result does not necessarily hold with imperfect competition.
Brulhart and Trionfetti (2004) prove that if a country has a unilateral home bias towards
a domestic monopolistic sector, it will also have more rms in that sector relative to the
other country (see e.g., Miyagiwa (1991) for impact on trade volumes).
Our framework di¤ers from this literature in a number of aspects. Brulhart and Tri-
onfetti (2004) consider a general equilibrium model in which there is both private con-
sumption and public procurement. Governments bias in favor of domestically produced
goods means that a given proportion of government purchases are reserved to domestic
producers (a higher proportion means a higher home bias). In our paper, there is no pri-
vate demand. Also, we have a multiple stage game where governments foresee the impact
that their domestic procurement decisions have on rm numbers. In order to make this
model more tractable, we use a partial equilibrium model which focuses on the simulta-
neous decisions of the procurement authorities across countries, each with an exogenous
procurement budget. However, unlike Brulhart and Trionfetti (2004), we allow for the ex-
istence of a group of non-producer countries and we generalize the standard Dixit-Stiglitz
preferences to include an additional like-for-variety element as in Benassy (1996). Given
the di¤erences between the two papers, comparing them is not straightforward. Using
the symmetric general equilibrium as the baseline, they analyze the impact of a unilateral
change in home bias on specialization. In that case, monopolistic competition with Dixit-
Stiglitz preferences are enough to make changes in home bias a¤ect the number domestic
rms relative to total rm numbers across the world. Whilst their focus is to analyze the
impact of asymmetric changes in home bias on international specialization (domestic num-
ber of rms relative to the rest of the world), our comparable objective is to analyze the
impact of a symmetric multilateral change in home bias across producers on the absolute
numbers of rms. For the standard Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, we show that this would
not have an impact on total rm numbers. When the additional like-for-variety element
or the external producer market are introduced, more home bias will lead to an increase
(see e.g., Levine and Smith, 2000, García-Alonso, 1999, 2000 and Levine, Mouzakis and Smith, 2000).
However, this literature considers market structure as exogenous.
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in the number of rms. Interestingly, in the cooperative case, the optimal number of rms
is independent of home bias.
The present paper is specically designed to capture government home bias. In a
separate paper (Coto-Martínez, García-Alonso and Levine (2005)), we develop a model in
which the bias lies within the private consumers. In that paper, there is no government
procurement, only private consumption. Although a parallel could be established between
the two papers, the modeling requirements are quite di¤erent. Even if there is a home bias,
with private consumers one must ensure that the international price arbitrage conditions
are met. Also, since there is only private consumption, governments have di¤erent policy
instruments such as domestic consumption subsidy, imports tari¤ and a xed cost subsidy
to the domestic rms. In the present paper, we focus on the impact that government
procurement decisions alone have on industry structure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the basic set-up and
the sequence of moves in the procurement game with governments and rms as players.
Section 3 solves the SPE with non-cooperative at the procurement stage one of the game.
Section 4 studies the cooperative procurement equilibrium at stage one and compares
it with the non-cooperative equilibrium. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
Detailed proofs of Propositions can be found in García-Alonso and Levine (2005).6
2 The Set-up
2.1 The Model
We model an international market for a public service good, consisting of ` producing
and importing countries and r non-producers who only import. The total budget in each
country available for this particular public service good is given.7 Producer country 1
6The earlier working paper version of this paper, García-Alonso and Levine (2005) also provides results
on the case where rms engage in strategic pricing. Dunne et al. (2007) adopts a similar framework to
examine the defence sector in an international market for arms where importing countries are engaged in
regional arms races.
7A constant share of GDP is devoted to defence or health can be defended as a realistic assumption,
but as is typical in the literature one could start with a national welfare function of the form U = U(C;C0)
where C is Dixit-Stiglitz index representing the output of a public service obtained from di¤erentiated
inputs ((1) below) and C0 is a numeraire good which in this context is remaining consumption. If the
7
produces di¤erentiated goods j = 1; 2;   ; n1, country 2 produces goods j = n1 + 1; n1 +
2;   ; n1 + n2; etc., so there are
P`
i=1 ni = N , say, goods in total. Governments procure
from domestic rms (if they exist) and overseas rms who enter or exit the market freely.
It makes for a simpler presentation if we focus on decisions in producer country 1.
Government 1 procures d1j ; j = 1; 2;   ; n1 domestically produced goods and m1j ; j =











35 1 ;  2 [0; 1);  > 0
(1)
In (1) the elasticity of substitution between all goods whether produced domestically or
imported is given by  = 11  > 1.
8 The weights w1 and 1  w1, with w1 2 [12 ; 1], express
the bias for domestic rather than imported procurement in country 1. If w1 = 12 , there is
no bias and at the other extreme if w1 = 1, there is autarky between producers. Thus in
this set-up we can regard 1  w1 as a measure of openness.9
If we put  = 0 and w1 = 12 , (1) reduces to the standard Dixit-Stiglitz utility function,
which is now commonplace in the new open macro-economy, new trade and endogenous
growth literatures. But, as Benassy (1996) points out, this form of utility is restricted in
that it implies a one-to-one correspondence between the taste for variety and the elasticity
of substitution. To see the signicance of this generalized form of the Dixit-Stiglitz utility
function, suppose there are two producer countries. Consider a certain amount of total
output y spread out between w1y units of a single variety in country 1 and (1 w1)y of a
sector in question is defence then C would be military security; if the sector is pharmaceuticals, then C
would be public health. If the utility is Cobb-Douglas (a standard assumption) then the expenditure on
the public service is constant and the model reduces to the one in this paper.
8 In the military context one can think of goods as types of planes, battle ships etc with the same
inter-type and intra-type, inter-country and intra-country elasticities of substitution. This is a standard
assumption in the new trade literature and new open economy macroeconomics. It is possible to extend
the analysis to allow for di¤erent inter and intra-type and country elasticities, but at an inevitable cost in
terms of tractability.

















is the fraction of the original
good that actually arrives, the rest melting awayon route. However, our model does not endogeneize the
reasons for the home bias.
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single variety in country 2. From (1), this will yield utility U1 = 1 [w1y+(1 w1)y] 1 = y
by the constant returns to scale property of our utility function.
Now let us dene a function v1(n1; n2) to represent the proportional utility gain from
spreading this output y between all N = n1 + n2 varieties rather than concentrated on
a proportion w1 on one variety in country 1 and a proportion 1   w1 on one imported
variety as before. Again, from (1), we can then express v1(n1; n2) as
v1(n1; n2) =
















[w1n1 + (1  w1)n2]+ 1
N
Suppose that the total number of varieties N = n1 + n2 increases, keeping the proportion
n1
n2







 1). We now dene the taste for variety by the elasticity Ndv1v1dN =  say,
given by  = Ndv1v1dN =  +
1
   1. The signicance of the extra term in (1) now becomes
apparent. If  = 0, then the taste for variety  = 1 1 which is determined solely by
the elasticity of substitution. Thus, the standard Dixit-Stiglitz formulation establishes an
arbitrary link between fundamentally di¤erent concepts: taste for variety and elasticity of
substitution, the latter, as we shall see, also determining the market power. Introducing
the extra  term breaks this link and has important consequences for the subsequent
analysis.
Governments in producer countries procure from domestic and foreign rms, possibly
at di¤erent prices. Let p1j be the price of the procured domestic good and Pj be the world
market price of the traded good of variety j produced by rms in all producing countries






Pjm1j = G1 (2)
where Gi is total procurement expenditure in country i.








and their budget constraint is given by (2) with n1 = 0.
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The model is completed by specifying the cost structure for the rm. Firm j in producer
country 1 produces d1j units of variety j for its domestic government at a procurement
price p1j and exports x1j units at an international market price Pj . The cost of producing
total output y1j = d1j + x1j is assumed to be
C(y1j) = F + cy1j (4)
We associate the rst term in (4) with xed capital costs and R&D, the nal term consti-
tutes variable costs. It follows that the prot of this rm is
1j = p1jd1j + Pjx1j   C(y1j): (5)
Finally, since there is free entry and exit, we must impose the participation constraint
1j  0.
2.2 Sequencing of Events
We rst consider the optimal decisions of a single government taking the decisions of other
governments as given. The sequencing of events is as follows:
1. Domestic Procurement by Producer Governments. Given total procurement
expenditure, the government in producer country 1 procures domestic goods of quantity d1j
at price p1j , for j = 1; 2; ; n1 given imports decided at stage 4,m1j , j = n1+1; n1+2; ; N
at the world market equilibrium price Pj . All decisions are subject to a budget constraint
and a non-negative prot participation constraint for domestic rms.
2. Free Entry and Exit by Firms. Given the procurement decision rms enter or
leave the sector.10
3. Price-Setting. With a commitment to producing d1j , in a price-setting equilibrium of
this stage of the game, rms in producer country 1 set world prices Pj and export quantity
x1j to countries i = 2;   ; `+ r.
4. Demand for Imports. Given the world market price Pj , and procurement expendi-
ture, governments in both producer and non-producer countries i = 1; 2;   ; `+ r procure
imports of good, mij , j = 1; 2;   ; N , where i 6= j for producer countries i = 1; 2;   ; `.
10The procurement price may be greater or less than the international market price. Firms already
participating in the international market will accept domestic procurement as long as the procurement
price exceeds the marginal cost.
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3 The Non-Cooperative Procurement Equilibrium
We now solve for the non-cooperative SPE in which governments in producer countries
make procurement decisions at stage one independently.11 We proceed by backward in-
duction starting at stage 4.
3.1 The Imports Decision at Stage 4
At stage 4, given the price Pj , and the number of di¤erentiated goods, the government in
producer country i = 1; 2;   ; ` chooses how much to import of each foreign variety mij , to
maximize utility given by (1) subject to its budget constraint (2) where the procurement
element is given. Using standard constrained optimization procedures, we get the import










; j 6= Ni 1 + 1; Ni 1 + 2;   ; Ni 1 + ni
= 0 ; j = Ni 1 + 1; Ni 1 + 2;   ; Ni 1 + ni (6)
where we have dened Ni = n1 + n2 +    + ni for i  1 (in which case N1 = n1 and










P 1 k ; i = 1; 2;   ; ` (7)
The analysis for non-producer countries is standard and results in a demand by gov-









k : Note that P^ =
~P
1
1  is the analogous price index of imported
goods facing each non-producer country (see, for example, Beath and Katsoulacos, 1991).
11Note that in the absence of procurement considerations at stage 1, the trade equilibrium from stage 2
onwards corresponds exactly to a standard trade model, see for example Krugman, 1979.
12Thus, country i = 1; 2; ; ` produces varieties j = Ni 1 + 1; Ni 1 + 2;   ; Ni 1 + ni = Ni and imports
mij units of variety j = 1; 2;   ; Ni 1; Ni + 1; Ni + 2,   ; N (dening N0 = 0).
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3.2 Price Setting at Stage 3
Proceeding to stage 3 of the game, in producer country 1 rm j = 1; 2;   ; n1 prot is
given by
1j = (p1j   c)d1j + (Pj   c)x1j   F ; j = 1; 2;   ; n1 (8)



















The rst term in (9) consists of exports to other producing countries and depends on the
procurement decisions already taken at stage 1 and on all prices set at this stage 3 of the
game. The second term consists of exports to non-producing countries and again depends
on the all prices set by rms at stage 3 of the game.









3.3 The Procurement Decision at Stage 1
We complete the equilibrium by evaluating the optimal decision of the government in
country 1 at the procurement stage of the game. In fact, stages 1 and 2 can be considered
together. The government when choosing the procurement price, p1, relaxes or tightens
the rmsparticipation constraint and, in e¤ect, chooses the number of domestic rms.
Imposing symmetry between identical domestic rms, procurement quantity will be the
same, d1j = d1 say, for all domestic varieties. Moreover, given the symmetry between
all rms within each country i = 2; 3;   ; ` in the international market, government 1
will choose the same amount of imports of each variety from country i, m1i say. We
examine the Nash equilibrium of stage 1 of the game and the SPE of the whole game. The
optimization problem of the government in country 1 is to maximize utility














with respect to independent choice variables d1 and n1,13 given the world prices Pi = P =
c
 of each variety from country i, the corresponding decisions of other countries, and two
constraints. These are the budget constraint (BC1) and the representative domestic rms
participation constraint (PC1) given by




PC1 : 1 = (p1   c)d1 + (P1   c)x1   F  0





where we have written net export revenue (P1   c)x1 = R(x1). It is useful to note that
exports x1 = x1j of each home variety j can be written in terms of decision variables as
the sum of exports to other producers (xp1) and to non-producers (x
np











P (n1 + n2 +   + n`)
= xp1 + x
np
1 (13)
Since we are assuming a Nash equilibrium in independent decision variables d1 and n1
at stage 1, we can eliminate the procurement price p1 using the PC1 constraint. It is then
apparent that the payment to the rm can also be treated as a lump sum of amount p1d1.
The symmetric non-cooperative procurement equilibrium under monopolistic compe-
tition can then be obtained using standard constrained optimization techniques. Two
closely related results presented below follow. The rst result, presented in Proposition
1 explains how the domestic procurement price will compare to the world market price.
Proposition 2 discusses how changes in some of the models parameters will a¤ect rm
numbers.
13Any two from four possible decision variables, d1, m1; p1 and n1 can be assumed, but will lead to
di¤erent Nash equilibria. Our particular choice, d1, and n1 is made partly, for analytical convenience, but
can be also justied by the need to observe decision variables in a more realistic incomplete information
setting, where the process of dynamic adjustment towards the equilibrium, for example of a Cournot-type,
needs to be addressed. It is plausible to assume that the domestic procurement decision, di, and the
number of rms supported, ni, i = 1; 2;   ; ` are more readily observed than the procurement price, pi,
i = 1; 2;   ; `, which involves a possibly hidden subsidy.
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Proposition 1: The Procurement Price
In a symmetric, non-cooperative procurement equilibrium, the procurement
price may be above or below the world market price. A high taste for variety
encourages the former and a large external market encourages the latter.
Proposition 2: The Number of Firms
In a symmetric, non-cooperative equilibrium the number of rms increases as
the taste for variety by producer countries increases. An increase in openness,
in the form of a reduction in preferences of producer countries for domestic
supply (home bias), and an increase in the relative size of the external market
results in a decrease in the number of rms.
In a traditionalDixit-Stiglitz utility function where  = 0 and in the limit as the
external market becomes small (but still of su¢ cient size to determine the world market
price), we have that the procurement price equals the market price. In our more general
model, the procurement price can be above or below the world market price.14 A high
taste for variety  encourages the former. The government then supports more domestic
rms, each producing a single variety, and will pay a higher procurement price to achieve
this. The intuition behind the external market e¤ect in these two propositions is that an
increase in the net export revenue relaxes the rmsparticipation constraints for a given
number of incumbents. This then enables governments to procure the same number of
varieties at a lower procurement price. In the non-cooperative procurement equilibrium,
each government takes into account only its own contribution to the world supply of
di¤erentiated goods and, through reducing the procurement price, it lowers its optimal
number of domestic rms as the external market becomes more important.15
One would think that one of the advantages of having a domestic sector from whom
14Note that as long as p > c, the rm having incurred the xed cost of entry will benet from the
procurement contract and in a free-entry equilibrium of identical rms, those relying only on the export
market will not be able to survive. Thus, through the procurement process, the government can choose
the number of rms in equilibrium.
15Note that, in a traditional monopolistic competition model (see Krugman (1979)), when economies
open to trade (with other symmetric economies), the number of domestically produced varieties does not
change. In this paper, a reduction in home bias can be seen as an increase in openness. However, changes
to home bias do a¤ect domestic rm numbers.
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to procure goods should be to allow the domestic procurement authorities to pay a price
for domestic procurement that is lower than the price at which domestic producers sell
internationally. Our price result actually proves that this is not necessarily the case.
Evidence from the military industry seems to suggest that the price charged to the domestic
government may actually be higher than the exports price (see (Chalmers et al. (2002)).
In the pharmaceutical industry, a more liberal method of price regulation may allow rms
to price their drugs at a higher level domestically.16 Interestingly, within the context of
our model, this would be explained by a strong independent love for variety and home
bias, e¤ects that dominate those of the external market.
It is tempting to establish parallels between our model and the Strategic Trade Liter-
ature result that states that the optimal strategic policy for rms competing in prices for
the exports market is to impose an exports tax so as to induce higher prices and therefore
higher prots. An immediate comparison cannot be made though. In our model, procure-
ment decisions are taken before rms compete for the exports market and can be seen as
a lump sum transfer to the rms. Although rm numbers are a¤ected by the procurement
transfer, in our monopolistic competition framework, international prices do not depend
on rm numbers and therefore, procurement policies do not a¤ect international prices
directly or indirectly.17
Turning to proposition 2, this result is consistent with the result on prices. The pro-
curement authority uses commitments to procurement volumes and prices as a means to
determine rm numbers. Less home bias will naturally decrease rm numbers as author-
ities become less interested in procuring domestic varieties, a similar thing happens with
less independent love for variety. Finally, a relatively bigger external market will change
the focus of the procurement authority towards ensuring that the exports market con-
tributes as much as possible to sustain the production of new varieties. Data seems to
show that concentration has risen in both military and drug industry to which this model
16For the UK case, the Pharmaceutical Industry Task Force (2005) explicitly states that prices of on-
patent medicines are on average towards the top end of European prices, although lower than US prices,
this is presented as a competitiveness indicator and justied by the need to contribute to the development
costs of new medicines.
17 If we allowed for strategic pricing, the impact of the relative size of the external market is stronger,
the reason for this is that the international price now depends on rm numbers and the lower transfer
encourages less rms and therefore higher international prices (see Garcia-Alonso and Levine (2005)).
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applies best. Achilladelis and Antonakis (2001) mention trade liberalization, increasing
development costs and time lags for introduction of new drugs, and a contraction in public
support for health care insurance as some of the reasons behind the 1980s-90s merger wave
in the pharmaceutical industry. The above result suggests that an increase in the relative
importance of external markets and less home bias (more openness) could also be behind
these changes. A willingness to procure from abroad, opennessin our terminology, and
the growing relative size of the international market of non-producers as production be-
comes more concentrated are two features one may associate with globalization. In that
sense we may conclude that our results suggest these aspects of globalization will result
in a decrease in the number of rms in the world market.
4 Procurement Cooperation Between Producer Governments
Up to this point, we have examined the SPE equilibrium of a game in which stage 1
is a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in procurement decisions. This section examines
what happens if these decisions are made jointly in a cooperative equilibrium at stage 1.
We pose this question in the context of the current discussion on possible ways to im-
prove cooperation in procurement policies for the defence and pharmaceutical industries
in the EU. Our objective in this section is to analyze the e¤ect of such cooperation on
rm numbers. Since rms are identical in their cost structures, we can impose symmetry.
Then, in a symmetric cooperative procurement agreement at stage 1, ` identical produc-
ers would jointly choose d1 = d2 =    = d` = d, n1 = n2 =    = n` = n to maximize
U1 = U2 =    = U` = U subject to budget and participation constraints. This leads to
the following result:
Proposition 3: Optimal Cooperative Procurement
In the optimal cooperative procurement arrangement, the total number of
rms is independent of the preferences of producer countries for domestic
supply. As with the non-cooperative equilibrium, an increase in the relative
size of the external market leads to a lower total number of rms under coop-
eration.
The independence of rm number on preferences contrasts with the non-cooperative
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equilibrium where an decrease in bias, w, leads to a decrease in the total number of rms
(see proposition 2). The reason for this is that, under cooperation, bias between countries
is internalized and the overall e¤ect on the outcome cancels out. As with non-cooperation,
the external revenue lowers the procurement price required to secure the participation of
each rm. By sharing the xed total demand in the external market over a smaller number
of rms in total, cooperating procuring governments can reduce the procurement cost. The
greater the size of the external market, the greater this e¤ect is.
Now let us compare the cooperative and non-cooperative outcomes. We are particularly
interested in the numbers of rms and whether cooperation contributes to the observed
increase in concentration. Denote the rm number per country in the cooperative and
non-cooperative equilibria by nC and nNC respectively. We then have the following re-
sult:
Proposition 4. Comparison of Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Equilibria
Comparing the cooperative and non-cooperative procurement equilibria with
no external market, taste for variety ( > 0) results in nNC < nC ; i.e., less
rms in the non-cooperative equilibrium. If  = 0 competition in the external
market results in nNC > nC ; i.e., more rms in the non-cooperative equilibrium.
In the case of no taste for variety and no external market ( = r = 0), we arrive
to the familiar Dixit-Stiglitz result that cooperation results in the same number of rms
as non-cooperation (nNC = nC). If  > 0; but, there is no external market, the non-
cooperative equilibrium is ine¢ cient: each country fails to internalize the external benet
to other countries from producing variety and as a result, too few varieties are produced;
i.e., nNC < nC .
When there is an external market but the Dixit-Stiglitz utility function is conventional
( = 0), the opposite is true: nC < nNC . Now the non-cooperative equilibrium is again
ine¢ cient but this time there are too many varieties produced compared with the e¢ cient
(from the viewpoint of producers) cooperative equilibrium. The reason for this is that
given that total demand is xed, competition for the external market sees revenue per
rm from external exports rise as the total number of rms falls. This occurs because
rms then compete less intensively and can spread their xed costs over a larger market
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share. Under non-cooperation, xed costs in each country are only spread over domestic
varieties whereas under cooperation governments collude to spread such costs over all
varieties. This results in an incentive to reduce the number of varieties still further.18
5 Conclusions
This paper has explored the strategic procurement behaviour by governments who can,
in e¤ect, choose the number of rms and their size by adjusting the procurement price.
In a standard Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition model where all countries are pro-
ducers, the procurement price coincides with the world market price, openness has no
e¤ect on market structure and cooperation between producer governments does not a¤ect
rm numbers. With an external market and a modied Dixit-Stiglitz utility function to
incorporate a taste for variety e¤ect, this is no longer the case.
In a symmetric, non-cooperative equilibrium, the number of rms is inuenced by
a number of factors. We show that number of rms increases as the taste for variety
by producer countries increases. In addition, an increase in openness, in the form of a
reduction in preferences of producer countries for domestic supply, and an increase in
the relative size of the external market, results in a decrease in the number of rms and
therefore an increase in concentration.
We also show that producer government cooperation in procurement decisions may
now a¤ect rm numbers. For example, for a large external market, coordination would
lead to more concentration.
The main implication of our results is that the marked increase in concentration in the
military sectors of the US and the EU can be explained by a increase in openness and the
increased importance of the external sector of arms importers. To some extent, this also
helps to explain concentration trends in the pharmaceutical industry.
In addition, our result on the impact of cooperation in procurement decisions on rm
numbers is specially relevant to the military industry in the EU context where di¤erent
levels of cooperation in military procurement are being discussed (Hartley (2006) discusses
current proposals for cooperation in the military industry).
18With strategic pricing by rms, this raises the price countries receive from the external market and
the incentive to reduce the number of rms is strengthened (see García-Alonso and Levine, 2005).
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Our paper makes a number of simplifying assumptions that allow us to use a model
specication that can be applied to a number of industries: home bias is exogenous, we
only analyze the symmetric equilibrium, we do not endogeneize the decision of countries
to become producers or non-producers and procurement budgets are exogenous. As al-
ready discussed, the motivation of the home bias may change across industries and also
across time and therefore, it is not easy to endogeneize whilst keeping the generality of the
model. The focus on the symmetric equilibrium is made to help us obtain explicit results
(Brulhart and Trionfetti (2001) analyze the asymmetric case for the standard Dixit-Stiglitz
framework). Also, endogeneizing the governments decisions on the size of the procure-
ment budget would again require us to make assumptions on the governments objective
function. These would include the more complex decision on how much national security
or health to provide; we just focus our analysis on military capability and pharmaceuticals
provision which are only elements of national security and health provision. Similar issues
arise when endogeneizing the decisions of countries to be producers or non-producers.
The above issues have been partially addressed in the defence and health literatures.
Our paper presents a simple analysis of the impact of government procurement policies
on market structure and prices. Finally, the regulation of the industries that motivate our
paper tends to be quite elaborate and contains other elements that may a¤ect industry
structure. For instance, in the case of the pharmaceutical industry, price regulation of
medicines is complex and varies across countries. For the military industry other policies
such as export controls inuence the market structure. Our paper aims to present a simple
model that may encompasses the idea that governments monopsony power can have an
impact on market structure that is applicable to at least these two industries.
References
Achilladelis, B. and Antonakis, N. (2001) The dynamics of technological innovation: the
case of the pharmaceutical industry. Research Policy, 30, 535-588.
Anton, J. and Yao, D. (1992) Coordination in split award auctions. Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 30, 538-552.
Baldwin, R. E. (1970) Nontari¤ Distortions of International Trade. Brookings Institu-
19
tion, Washington, D. C.
Baldwin, R. E. (1984) Trade Policies in Developed Countries. R. W. Jones and P. B.
Kenen, eds., Handbook of International Economics, Vol. 1, Amsterdam: North-
Holland.
Beath, J. and Katsoulacos, Y. (1991) The Economic Theory of Product Di¤erentiation,
Cambridge University Press.
Benassy, J. P. (1996) Taste for variety and optimum production patterns in monopolistic
competition. Economic Letters, 52, 41-47.
Branco, F. (1994) Favouring domestic rms in procurement contracts. Journal of Inter-
national Economics, 37, 65-80.
Brulhart, M. and Trionfetti, F. (2004) Public expenditure, international specialization
and agglomeration. European Economic Review, 48, 851-881.
Coto-Martínez, J., García-Alonso, M. C. and Levine, P. (2005) Taste for variety and
optimum product diversity in an open economy, University of Kent, Discussion Paper
No. 05/08.
Dixit, A. K. and Stiglitz, J. E. (1977) Monopolistic competition and optimal product
diversity. American Economic Review, 67(3), 297-308.
Dunne, J. P., García-Alonso, M. C., Levine, P. and Smith, R. P. (2003) Concentration
in the international arms industry. University of the West of England Discussion
Paper No. 03/01.
Dunne, J. P., García-Alonso, M. C., Levine, P. and Smith, R. P. (2007) Determining the
defence industrial base. Defence and Peace Economics, 18(3), 199-221.
García-Alonso, M. C. (1999) Price competition in a model of the arms trade. Defence
and Peace Economics, 10(3), 273-303.
García-Alonso, M. C. (2000) The role of technology in a model of horizontal di¤erentia-
tion. International Journal of Industrial Economics, 18(5), 747-773.
20
García-Alonso, M. C. and Levine, P. (2005) Strategic procurement, openness and market
structure, University of Kent, Discussion Paper No. 05/03.
García-Alonso, M. C. and Levine, P. (2007) Arms trade and arms races: a strategic
analysis. Handbook of Defence Economics II, Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler eds.,
North Holland, Series in Economic Handbooks.
Hartley, K. (2006) Defence industrial policy in a military alliance. Journal of Peace
Research, 43(4), 473-489.
Krugman, P. R. (1979) Increasing returns, monopolistic competition, and international
trade. Journal of International Economics, 9(4), 469-479.
Kyle, M. K. (2007) Pharmaceutical price controls and entry strategies. The Review of
Economics and Statistics, 89(1), 88-99.
La¤ont, J. J. and Tirole, J. (1993) A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation.
Cambridge, M. A.: MIT Press.
Levine, P. and Smith, R. (2000) The arms trade game: from laissez-faire to a common
defence policy. Oxford Economic Papers, 52, 357-380.
Levine, P., Mouzakis, F. and Smith, R. (2000). Arms export controls and emerging
domestic producers. Defence and Peace Economics, 11, 505-530.
Matraves, C. (1999) Market Structure, R&D and advertising in the pharmaceutical in-
dustry. The Journal of Industrial Economics. XLVII(2), 169-194.
McAfee, R.P. and McMillan, J. (1989) Government procurement and international trade.
Journal of International Economics, 26, 291-308.
McGuire, T. and Riordan, M. H. (1995) Incomplete information and optimal market
structure. Public purchases from private providers. Journal of Public Economics,
58, 283-307.
Miyagiwa, K. (1991) Oligopoly and discriminatory government procurement policy. Amer-
ican Economic Review, 81, 1321-1328.
NHS procurement review, Cabinet O¢ ce 1998.
21
O¢ ce of Fair Trade (2004) Assessing the impact of public sector procurement on com-
petition. O¢ ce of Fair Trade: www.oft.gov.uk.
Pharmaceutical Industry Task Force, Competitiveness and Performance Indicators, 2005.
Department of Health: www.advisorybodies.doh.gov.uk/pictf
Vagstad, S. (1995) Promoting fair competition in public procurement. Journal of Public
Economics, 58, 283-307.
Vogel, D. (1998) The globalization of pharmaceutical regulation. Governance, 11(1),
1-22.
22
